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COMMENTARY ON RENT CONTROL AND THE
THEORY OF EFFICIENT REGULATION
W. Dennis Keating*
Professor Epstein's polemic against rent control begins with
the classic anecdote - a tale of the black market in rent con-
trolled apartments in New York City, a favorite target of rent
control opponents, featuring the author as a college senior.
While confessing that as a student tenant he luckily enjoyed the
protection and benefits of rent control, he explains that his ini-
tial skepticism "ripened into overt hostility."'
Epstein's hostility toward rent control is grounded in his
view that rent control, as well as other forms of regulation, is
unconstitutional because it amounts to confiscation of private
property without the just compensation required by the fifth
and fourteenth amendments. The enactment of rent control is
based upon the exercise of the police power, typically by a mu-
nicipality, to protect the general welfare. The police power au-
thorization for controlling rents charged by private landlords is
based upon legislative findings of a serious housing shortage.2
The basic fallacy of Epstein's radically conservative view of
American constitutional law is his refusal to recognize that the
exercise of the police power is not a per se taking. He notes that
the police power must be read into the Constitution. Of course,
courts have done exactly that for decades and have frequently
distinguished between the legitimate exercise of the police power
and a regulatory taking. Despite a long line of state and federal
precedents dating from the original rent cases of 1921, a which
contradict him, Epstein claims that the state intervention that
* Loyola College, A.B., 1965; University, of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1968; University of
California at Berkeley, M.C.P., 1971, J.D., 1978. Associate Professor of Urban Affairs and
Acting Director, Law, Politics and Public Policy Program, Cleveland State University.
I Epstein, Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 741, 742 (1988).
2 Baar & Keating, The Last Stand of Economic Substantive Due Process - The
Housing Emergency Requirement for Rent Control, 7 URn. LAW. 447, 448, 465-66 (1975).
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 134 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman,
256 U.S. 170 (1921).
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transforms private leases by regulating rents and evictions
amounts to a taking for a public purpose, therefore triggering
the just compensation requirement of eminent domain. This
view has been rejected since the time rent control was first chal-
lenged. The same argument was mounted against land use con-
trols and has been repeatedly rejected by many courts.4 In Ep-
stein's view, most regulations are simply disguised taxation.
Carried to its logical conclusion, his view would result in the in-
ability of government to protect citizens against conditions
threatening the public welfare without either compensating
those owners of private property adversely affected by its ac-
tions, or imposing taxes to fund the protective policy which it
adopts. Of course, this would quite often prove to be fiscally im-
practical and politically impossible.
What is the public necessity that requires the imposition of
rent control? According to Epstein, no social case can be made
to justify rent regulation. Epstein chooses to ignore the housing
problems that have given rise to rent control. For example, in its
1988 report to Congress, the National Housing Task Force cited
such serious problems as the declining stock of affordable hous-
ing and the increasing number of tenants, millions, mostly poor,
living in substandard housing and paying very high proportions
of their income for rent.5 These conditions preceded rent control
in New York City and they remain very serious problems.' Of
course, rent control protects not only poor but also moderate
and middle-income tenants, most of whom would otherwise be
subject to extreme rent fluctuations in tight housing markets.
What Epstein does address is the justification offered by
Justice Holmes in Block v. Hirsh7 to uphold the 1919 Washing-
ton, D.C. rent regulations, which attempted to redress the hous-
" See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-90 (1926). In its
most recent decisions, the United States Supreme Court has made it more possible for
landowners to challenge land use controls on the theory that they amount to regulatory
takings. However, the Court has not equated land use controls based upon the exercise
of the police power with unconstitutional takings requiring the payment of just compen-
sation. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S.
Ct. 2378, 2381, 2389 (1987); and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141
(1987).
1 NATIONAL HOUSING TASK FORCE, A DECENT PLACE TO LIvE (1988) [hereinafter
HOUSING TASK FORCE].
e See, e.g., M. STEGMAN, HOUSING IN NEW YORK STUDY OF A CITY 1984 (1984).
256 U.S. 134 (1921), discussed in Epstein, supra note 1, at 751, 770 & n.67.
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ing shortage produced by the temporary population influx of
World War I. Comparing this to the aftermath of the 1906 San
Francisco earthquake, Epstein offers two solutions other than
rent control. First, he suggests that the increase in unregulated
rents would have produced more rental units and reduced ten-
ant demand. This neat supply-demand equilibrium solution is
the textbook solution of market economists but would hardly
have protected many tenants during that period. It is unlikely
that sufficient new or converted housing would have been pro-
duced quickly enough to satisfy demand. In addition, those te-
nants unable to pay the rising market rents attributable to the
war induced shortage would have been forced into crowded and
often substandard housing. This does not seem to concern Ep-
stein, but it is exactly why the federal government introduced
temporary rent control nationally during World War II.
Second, Epstein explains that the "right" response would
have been rental allowances to federal employees unable to af-
ford market rents funded by general revenues. Housing advo-
cates have often argued for housing allowances, as have land-
lords opposing rent control. The federal government did conduct
a national housing allowance experiment in the 1970s,' and the
Reagan administration has supported housing vouchers (as an
alternative to public housing).
However, no local government could itself afford to provide
housing allowances to all those in need. For example, the Dis-
trict of Columbia has its own version of the federal section 8
rent subsidy program. The District's tenant assistant program
(TAP), enacted in 1985, is designed to keep the housing pay-
ments of low- and moderate-income tenants at a maximum of 30
percent of their income. As of January 1988, although $15 mil-
lion had been allocated annually, only 2,581 TAP certificates
had been issued and only 1,095 households had actually been
able to use them. Yet, TAP has a waiting list of more than
10,000 households, and it is estimated that 55,000 households
are eligible while there is only enough funding for a maximum of
3,500 households.9
" See, e.g., R. STRUYK & M. BENDICK, HOUSING VOUCHERS FOR THE PooP. LESSONS
FROM A NATIONAL EXPERIMENT 57 (1981).
9 M. TURNER, RENT CONTROL AND THE AVAiLABILITY OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. A DELICATE BALANCE 47-50 (1988).
1989]
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There is no real prospect that the federal government, par-
ticularly since the abandonment of our national housing produc-
tion goals in the 1970s and the Reagan era housing subsidy cut-
backs and budget deficit, can or will attempt to provide either
adequate demand or supply housing subsidies. According to the
National Housing Task Force, in 1987 there were 7.8 million
renter households with annual incomes of less than $10,000 eligi-
ble for federal housing assistance that were not receiving assis-
tance.10 Epstein does not discuss the reality of the housing situa-
tion in which the market does not provide affordable housing
and the government does not provide adequate housing subsi-
dies. The reality is that many citizens, especially lower income
tenants, must pay dearly for what is all too often substandard
housing.
An alternate view is that housing, like other necessities,
should be viewed as a fundamental right or entitlement. Indeed,
Justice Holmes argued that housing was clothed with a public
interest because it "is a necessary of life."" Although the Su-
preme Court rejected the argument that housing is a constitu-
tionally protected fundamental right in Lindsey v. Normet,1 2 the
effort continues to legislate this concept in the form of an enti-
tlement. The most notable recent example has been the legal,
political, and moral efforts of the advocates of the homeless to
guarantee at least minimal shelter to the most deprived segment
of our population.' 3 Professor Epstein rejects this concept as
"communitarian cant" which offends the social welfare stan-
dards of economists.
Epstein does not recognize a right to security of tenure un-
less it results from private negotiations between landlord and
tenant in the form of a lease. However, for many tenants the
right to negotiate such protection is illusory since they lack the
individual or organized power to obtain much protection against
displacement. Most residential leases are short-term. In those
housing markets with low vacancy rates, high demand for apart-
10 HoUSING TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 7.
" Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 156.
12 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972). For the best explanation of the right to
housing, see Michelman, The Advent of a Right to Housing: A Current Appraisal, 5
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 207, 209-11 (1970).
11 See, e.g., Note, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 939, 940 n.5 (1984).
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ments and condominiums, and wide income differences, the
housing market frequently leads to gentrification which dis-
places those lower-income tenants unable to compete
economically.' 4
Eviction controls serve the purpose of preventing landlord
evasion of rent controls through the threat of evicting protesting
tenants and also provide the security of tenure that prevents ar-
bitrary displacement. Of course, tenants must still pay the regu-
lated rents and otherwise comply with the terms of their statu-
tory leases. Although Epstein is correct that this can distort
tenant mobility patterns, a greater distortion occurs if vacancy
decontrol exists. This encourages landlords to harass tenants
into vacating the apartment so it can be rerented at market
rents. Vacancy decontrol may undercut the protection of "sit-
ting" tenants unless eviction controls are strictly enforced. Ep-
stein argues that rent control generally increases landlords' in-
centives for eviction if a vacated unit can be deregulated or
converted to another use. However, well-organized and well-in-
formed tenants are not so easily intimidated, especially where
rent control is strictly enforced. In many localities with rent con-
trols, there are also condominium conversion and demolition
controls in existence to prevent the loss of these units."
Although Epstein concedes that rent control legislation dif-
fers considerably in its form and administration, he argues that
this is of little importance since all are per se unconstitutional.
Epstein directs his analysis to two recent decisions: Hall v. City
of Santa Barbara6 and Pennell v. City of San Jose.1 The for-
mer case involved mobile home rent control. Epstein agrees with
the court's decision, which allowed the landlord (the mobile
home park owner) to pursue a takings claim by reasoning that
the law provided compensation for a physical invasion of the
landlord's property by the occupying tenants, and by concluding
14 C. HARTMAN, D. KEATING & R. LEGATES, DISPLACEMENT,. How To FIGHT IT (1982).
For a positive evaluation of the impact of rent control in a gentrifying market, see Note,
Reassessing Rent Control: Its Economic Impact in a Gentrifying Housing Market, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1835 (1988).
15 Bryant & McGee, Gentrification and the Law: Combatting Urban Displacement,
25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 43 (1983).
813 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988).
17 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988). These cases are analyzed in Epstein, supra note 1, at 750-
1989]
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that the owner's property interests had been transferred to the
tenant. Epstein applauds this interpretation of the effect of rent
control. He also agrees that the landlord can contest whether the
regulated rents constitute just compensation. However, he dis-
agrees with the reasoning that a taking occurred based on the
physical invasion theory because he believes that rent control
should be considered unconstitutional per se.
Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically declined to consider
this issue in Pennell.'8 Epstein agrees with Justice Scalia's dis-
sent that consideration of tenant as well as landlord hardship
amounts to disguised taxation of landlords (or other tenants) for
the benefit of poorer tenants.19 Epstein rejects the adequacy of
the fair return on investment requirement as a guarantee against
depriving landlords of due process protection. Epstein first dis-
misses established law that rejects landlords' contentions that a
regulated return must be based upon market value. This circular
reasoning, which undermines the very purpose of rent control,
has been correctly rejected by the California and New Jersey Su-
preme Courts.2 0 Epstein fails to note that the courts have found
that the Constitution does not require that landlords be guaran-
teed positive cash flow and a particular level of return. Epstein
offers no evidence that landlords have not received a fair return
under rent control but simply asserts that this is so.
Instead of empirical evidence, Epstein relies upon the argu-
ments of economists, whom he states are united in their con-
demnation of rent control. However, as Weitzman documents,
this concurrence is based mostly on theory, rather than on much
empirical evidence.21 Typical examples appear in Epstein's cri-
tique. He assumes, for example, that rental housing markets are
generally competitive. This is not necessarily the case at all.
There is evidence suggesting that, because such competition is
nonexistent, rising rents do not necessarily lead to supply in-
Pennell, 108 S. Ct. at 858 n.6.
19 Id. at 863-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20 Baar, Guidelines for Drafting Rent Control Laws: Lessons of a Decade, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 723, 797-803 (1983). See also Drobak, Constitutional Limits on Price
and Rent Control: The Lessons of Utility Regulation, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 107, 141-42 &
n.158 (1986).
21 Weitzman, Economics and Rent Regulation: A Call for a New Perspective, 13
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 975, 975-76 (1984-85).
[Vol. 54: 1223
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creases. 22 Epstein argues that, even though rent controls exempt
new construction, rent controls will act as a disincentive to new
construction. Empirical evidence indicates that the level of new
construction does not necessarily vary between similar rent con-
trolled and non-rent controlled jurisdictions.2 3 Epstein argues
that draconian New York City rent controls led to massive aban-
donment of housing by regulated landlords. He ignores data that
cites factors other than rent control to explain this widespread
phenomenon.24
Epstein presents neither convincing arguments - legal, eco-
nomic, political, or moral - nor empirical evidence to support
his absolutist position that the regulation of rental housing
through the police power to deal, at least temporarily, with seri-
ous housing problems must be characterized as a taking of pri-
vate property. The courts have correctly upheld the right of gov-
ernment to regulate the private market where the public welfare
requires that tenants be protected amidst a housing shortage.
Landlords' rights to due process and fair return on their invest-
ment have been protected. The courts have often intervened
where rent control legislation or its administration have violated
the rights of property owners. The courts must balance the com-
peting interests of landlords and tenants.25
Professor Epstein seems most disturbed by rent control be-
cause it offends his views about economic efficiency and good
public policy. He is certainly entitled to his view, as are land-
lords opposed to rent regulation. However, this does not mean
that the courts should, therefore, intervene to impose these
views of public policy. The Supreme Court rejected this doctrine
22 See J. GILDERBLOOM & R. APPELBAUM, RETHINKING RENTAL HOUSING 57-67 (1988),
which empirically studies landlord behavior and rental housing markets, rejects conven-
tional theories of the determinants of rents, and critiques the failure of market allocation
of rental housing.
23 See Baar, Facts and Fallacies in the Rental Housing Market, 62 W. CITY 47
(1986) and Gilderbloom, The Impact of Moderate Rent Control in New Jersey: An Em-
pirical Study of 26 Rent Controlled Cities, 7 URB. ANALYSIS 135 (1983).
" See Bartelt & Lawson, Rent Control and Abandonment in New York City: A
Look at the Evidence, in CRITICAL PERSPECTVES ON HOUSING (R. Bratt, C. Hartman & A.
Meyerson eds. 1986).
25 See Note, The Constitutionality of Rent Control Restrictions on Property Own-
ers' Dominion Interests, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1067, 1078-79 (1987). The author argues that
the courts must take into consideration the liberty interests of tenants as well as the
dominion interests of landlords.
1989]
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in the 1930s.26 Pennell is a sign that the Court is not prepared to
return to the use of the doctrine of economic substantive due
process to invalidate legislation that does not comport with its
views on social policy.
I, too, believe, along with Professor Epstein and Justice
Scalia, that rent control should be subject to the democratic pro-
cess. Rent controls have been enacted democratically, either by
state and local legislative bodies or by the initiative and referen-
dum. Landlords have participated in this process and have exer-
cised great influence by defeating, amending, and repealing rent
control. The political rather than the judicial forum is the
proper place for this debate over economic regulatory policy.
26 Baar & Keating, supra note 1, at 470-72.
27 See Keating, Dispersion and Adaptation: The California Experience, in THE
RENT CONTROL DEBATE 65 (P. Niebanck ed. 1985).
[Vol. 54: 1223
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